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EXTERNALITIES, RISK AND THE PRIVATE PROPERTY-OVERGRAZING PARADOX: THE
CASE OF PRIVATE CATTLE FARMS IN NYABUSHOZI COUNTY, WESTERN UGANDA.
 Dick Sserunkuuma and Kent Olson
Much of the rangeland management policies the world over have been directed towards private
ownership of rangelands. In the historically pastoral societies of Africa, tenure reforms (away from the
commons and toward private tenure) have often been justified on the argument that pastoralists overstock,
overgraze and damage the rangeland resources...because of the mismanagement inherent in the traditional
patterns of communal rangeland tenure combined with individual herd ownership--along the lines of the
tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968 cited in Homewood and Rodgers, 1988). Following this line of
reasoning, many economic consultants and planners, as well as researchers (Johnson, 1972 and Picardi,
1974 cited in Runge, 1981; and Demsetz, 1967; Anderson and Hill, 1977; Libecap, 1981 cited in Stevenson,
1991) have often prescribed private property as the only solution to this (overgrazing) “tragedy of the
commons”. In other words, they advocate for the imposition of private property schemes as a means of
“internalizing” a common property externality. Underlying such a prescription is the belief that privatization
is necessary and sufficient to solve the commons dilemma (Ostrom, 1990).
This belief is predicated on two notions. First, all jointly grazed rangelands are bound to be
overexploited in the long-run due to the high incentive among the individual grazers to free-ride. This is
because the private benefits of grazing an additional head of cattle on the common range exceed the
private cost, since the cost of maintaining range quality can be shifted to the group as a whole (Runge,
1981). Thus, the pursuit of self-interest locks each herdsman into a system that compels him to increase
his herd without limit￿in a world which is limited (Hardin, 1968), which results in overgrazing. Second,
a secure, exclusive grazing right incites the grazer to graze at an optimal rate. This is because the private
rights holder not only reaps the benefits but also incurs all the costs of adding an extra head of cattle to
his/her private range, and a balancing of these benefits and costs is an invisible hand that guides the     2
grazer to an optimal grazing (stocking) rate
1 (Stevenson, 1991).
Examining rangeland tenure and pastoralism in their historical perspective reveals that the
legislative mechanisms and policy formulation process in Uganda have been influenced by the need to
introduce private rangeland tenure (Kisamba-Mugerwa, 1995). For example, land that was communally
grazed in the past in the Ankole-Masaka Ranching Scheme (AMRS), Nyabushozi county, Mbarara district,
was subdivided into smaller land parcels by the state appointed Ranch Restructuring Board (RRB) and re-
allocated to individual pastoralists starting in the late 1980's. The pastoralists have been encouraged and in
some cases assisted to fence off the allocated land. The primary goal of this privatization scheme was to
mitigate overgrazing and rangeland resource-use conflicts in the AMRS area. By putting the user rights in
the hands of the resource owners, the government thought they had given the pastoralists the necessary
incentives for adopting overgrazing mitigating practices. Outside the AMRS in Nyabushozi county, land
registration (to private owners) was undertaken as a development project by the local county development
association--Nyabushozi Development Agency (NDA). NDA has assisted many residents to acquire land
titles; and because of this local development project--coupled with the fact that the privatization scheme has
received full support from the stakeholders, i.e., the pastoralists (Sserunkuuma, 1995), it is almost certain
that communal rangeland tenure is being phased out in Nyabushozi (Kisamba-Mugerwa, 1992).
However, Ostrom (1990) argues that after dividing the meadow in half and assigning one half to
each of two herders, each herder will now be playing a game against nature in a smaller terrain, rather than
a game against another player in a larger terrain. If rainfall occurs erratically, one part of the meadow may
be lush with growth one year, whereas another part may be unable to support half of the original animals. If
the location of lush growth changes dramatically from year to year, dividing the commons may impoverish
both herders and lead to overgrazing. Behnke and Scoones (1992) also question the advisability of fenced
                    
1  However, Stevenson (1991) argues that for private property to provide the optimal solution, there
must be: no divergence between social and private discount rates; no externalities; and no imperfect capital
markets or other market imperfections.     3
ranches--a result of privatization--in the face of high moisture variability, due to unpredictable climatic
variations in the semi-arid tropics. They argue that, if a herd is confined to one place, livestock numbers,
viability and productivity are limited by the scarcest resource in the scarcest season in that place.
As Peters (1994) put it, the sine qua non of dryland cattlekeeping in Africa has been mobility.
Privatization reduces the land area available to individual pastoralists and eliminates the mobility and
flexibility in grazing that is crucial in the management of climatic risk. The reduction in land area and cattle
mobility worsens the routine scarcity of water and pasture resources in the dry season, since the practice of
moving cattle--on a larger terrain--to where these resources are is no longer permissible.  Further more,
evidence from other studies on pastoralist livestock systems in Africa seems to suggest a widespread
reluctance on the part of pastoralists to market cattle regularly--even when faced with forage scarcity. This
reluctance stems from a concept that cattle are a store of wealth or a savings account from which
withdrawals are made only for special social or ceremonial occasions, or for emergency needs such as
payments for education, etc. (de Wilde, p. 55-56 cited in Doran et al., 1979). Hence, as they struggle to
maintain herd size on fewer resources--thanks to privatization, the likelihood that the pastoralists overgraze
increases.
As a store of  wealth, cattle provide satisfaction in terms of numbers; and as a source of food (milk)
and income, they provide satisfaction in terms of milk and meat output--an attribute that bestows cash and
food values on cattle. The cash and food values are important as far as current consumption needs are
concerned; but numbers of animals are often more important than cash and food values as far as the security,
prestige and status aspects of wealth are concerned (Doran et al., 1979). In this paper we show that these
three attributes of cattle--that is, as a wealth store, and source of food and income--reinforce each other to
cause overgrazing on private rangelands. We argue first, that the absence of wealth storage alternatives
encourages pastoralists to store all their wealth or savings in form of cattle, which increases the likelihood of
overgrazing, especially if there are no alternative feed sources to supplement the natural pastures. We also     4
argue that over-dependence on cattle for food (milk) and income causes pastoralists to over-invest in cattle
(overstock), since fewer cattle mean less aggregate milk output and, thus, less food and income. In other
words, the current consumption needs make the pastoralists’ planning horizon shorter than society’s, thereby
causing them to “mine” the natural pasture resource at a higher rate than is socially optimal and, thus,
imposing a temporal externality to society. We also show that in the presence of high risk of cattle loss, the
seemingly plausible overgrazing abatement strategy of breed improvement
2 only serves to exacerbate the
problem of overgrazing.
Definition and Measurement of Overgrazing.
The common definition of overgrazing or rangeland overuse, is the exploitation of a rangeland
beyond its carrying capacity (CC), further defined as the number of animals that the rangeland can support
on a sustainable basis (Stevenson, 1991). Critics, exemplified by Behnke (1992) argue that it makes little
sense to talk about overgrazing as defined in this way--without taking into account the management
objectives of the rangeland users. He contends that the confusion between “ecological” and “economic” CC
has resulted in misleading CC estimates, and that a distinction ought to be made between the two.
The ecological CC occurs at the point where the production of forage on the rangeland equals the
rate of its consumption by animals. At this point, the animal population ceases to grow because the limited
feed supplies equate death rates to birth rates, and there is no surplus production either of animals or
biomass. On the other hand, the economic CC occurs at the point of maximum sustained yield, i.e., the point
at which sustainable animal offtake rate is highest. This point coincides with the stocking density at which
the animal population is growing most rapidly. It usually lies at about half to two-thirds of the stocking
                    
2  Among other things, animal productivity depends on the genetic potential of animals. Based on
the argument that pastoralists overstock to compensate for the low productivity of the local-breed cattle, it
has often been suggested that breed improvement--which is expected to boost milk productivity per cow--
might reduce the need to overinvest in cattle (overstock) as means of obtaining the desired level of
aggregate milk output from the herd, and in so doing reduce the likelihood of overgrazing.     5
density at the ecological CC (Caughley, 1979 cited in Behnke and Scoones, 1992).
To incorporate the range managers objectives, Behnke and Scoones (1992) suggest an alternative
definition, which they call “the only embracing definition of CC.” They define CC as that density of animals
and plants that allows the manager to get what s/he wants out of the system. They argue that under certain
conditions and depending on the management objectives of the rangeland manager, it is technically feasible
and economically profitable to stock at various points on the CC frontier, that is, at the ecological or the
economic CC, or below both. A wildlife manager, for example, may desire a high animal population well
above the economic CC to increase the chances that tourists who visit a park for game viewing actually
confront the animals they come to see. On the other hand, a rancher who aims at producing maximum
kilograms of meat for sale will require a density of animals that provides the maximum sustained yield of
meat, that is, the economic CC as defined by Caughley. However, because of the holding costs of
domesticated animals, economically optimal stocking densities for commercial ranchers lie below the
economic CC (Wilson and Macleod, 1991 cited in Behnke and Scoones, 1992). Pastoralists, who keep cattle
mainly for subsistence reasons, to harvest animal output in the form of live animal products such as milk,
blood, traction power and transport, can profitably exploit a large standing crop of animals. At some cost in
terms of lower output, health and viability of individual animals, these producers may be capable of
maintaining high levels of aggregate output at stocking densities approaching ecological CC (Payne, 1990
cited in Behnke and Scoones, 1992). However, these costs could be substantial, making it more profitable to
maintain stocking densities that are closer to the economic CC.
On the other hand, some economists argue that social policy should be to maximize net economic
yield, which in general is not synonymous with utilization at the CC or the point of maximum output
because the latter ignores the economic aspects of range and herd management. Therefore, economists
define overgrazing as any level of grazing (stocking) beyond that which would maximize net economic
returns from the rangeland (Stevenson, 1991).     6
Empirical work on measuring overgrazing is complicated by the fact that it is a relative and
multifaceted concept, with no known cardinal measure. Using the CC-based definition of overgrazing,
overgrazing could be measured as the difference between the CC and the actual stocking density on the
rangeland. However, Bartels et al. (1990) criticize the CC-based measure of overgrazing because of the
conceptual ambiguity and measurement error inherent in CC estimates. In addition, Behnke and Scoones
(1992) argue that CC is an equilibrium concept,
3 and that it is analytically useful only in the context of
stable equilibrium environments, where the rainfall is higher and more reliable, and the pastoralists and their
livestock are important agents of vegetation changes. They claim that, in non-equilibrium grazing systems,
the wide, unpredictable and uncontrollable fluctuations in the climate are more important determinants of
range productivity than is stocking rates (Ellis and Swift, 1988 cited in Behnke and Scoones, 1992).
Behnke and Scoones (1992) further argue that rangeland degradation or overgrazing ought to be
measured as a permanent (irreversible) decline in the rate at which the rangeland yields livestock products.
They propose several biophysical indicators of range degradation, and suggest that these should be
examined to determine to what extent they identify permanent losses in livestock output. However, the
reliability of these indicators as measures of irreversible decline in livestock production on Africa's
rangelands is questionable too. The proposed indicators include: (1) soil changes such as decreased fertility,
decreased water holding capacity, decreased infiltration and soil loss significantly in excess of soil
formation, (2) vegetation changes such as severe bush encroachment, changes in vegetation productivity
over time unrelated to rainfall patterns, changes in vegetation cover, changes in plant species composition of
use to animals, and (3) livestock production such as condition scoring of animals, calving rates and death
rates (population models) and milk yields.
Literally, the Behnke-Scoones definition of rangeland degradation says that degradation occurs only
                    
3 
    Behnke and Scoones argue that any notion of carrying capacity--be it ecological or economic, is
predicated on the notion that herbivore numbers are controlled through the availability of forage, and that
the availability of forage is controlled by animal numbers. This pattern of negative feed back eventually     7
after crossing a critical threshold after which productivity losses are irreversible. However, it is very difficult
to pinpoint the cut-off line where a range crosses from having temporary rainfall-induced to permanent
human-induced vegetation changes. Given that crossing this cut-off line doesn't occur instantly but rather
over time, and through observable successive vegetation changes, a lot can and should be done to influence
the behavior
4 of pastoralists toward range conservation, before permanent damage is inflicted on Africa's
rangelands. This is possible, provided the appropriate policy measures are taken; and the appropriateness of
the available policy alternatives can be determined through empirical research. With the overly restrictive
Behnke-Scoones definition, however, it becomes very difficult to justify empirical research work to address
the dangers of rangeland degradation in Africa--be it real or potential dangers, if one has to first prove that
degradation--as defined by Behnke and Scoones--has actually occurred. The idea of waiting until a rangeland
is permanently destroyed before we can talk about overgrazing and, hence, do something about it implicitly
attaches a positive quasi option value to waiting. However, the validity of this assumption is highly
questionable, given the importance of rangeland resources in African economies; and the enormous costs that
would have to be incurred to re-instate the rangelands to their original state after damaging them
permanently.
In conclusion, the critics have been quite successful in clarifying the misconceptions regarding the
utility of the CC concept, however, they do not offer much in the way of a working alternative. We, therefore,
concur with Hocking and Mattick (1993) that until a more user-friendly alternative is presented, in a practical,
rather than conceptual framework, CC remains the best practical tool available to planners; and we offer no
apologies for using CC in this study. Moreover in our case, the rainfall in the study area is fairly reliable and
                                                                              
produces a stable equilibrium between animal and plant populations.
    4 While pastoralists have no control over the climate, their choices in terms of species, number, breed,
sex and age composition of their herds affect the primary and secondary productivity of their rangelands.
Government policies can influence these choices via their effect on the structure of incentives and constraints
facing the pastoral households.     8
high (about 900 mm annually
5), thus, the environment in the study area can be characterized as relatively
stable, with an equilibrium pattern between animal and plant population; which makes the concept of CC 
applicable.
In this paper, overgrazing has been defined as rangeland use that depresses net economic yield
below its maximum. By definition, therefore, overgrazing is measured as the departure of the actual
stocking rate from the one that maximizes net economic returns from the rangeland, hereby referred to as
the economic optimum stocking rate (OSR). Since the economic optimum or most profitable stocking rate
occurs at the point where the net economic yield is at a maximum, the OSR can be determined using profit
maximization principles. Hildreth and Riewe (1963) used data from stocking density experiments at Texas
Agricultural Experiment Station to determine the OSR. Assuming a linear biological relationship between
weight gain per animal and the stocking rate, they defined the net economic yield (net return per acre of
grazing land) as the ending value of the animals less the initial value, and the costs of grazing and pasture
improvement. They set the first derivative of the net economic yield equation--with respect to stocking rate--
equal to zero and solved for the OSR as a function of the biological weight gain, adjusted down by the costs
of production relative to the selling price.
Torrell et al. (1991) added a dynamic component to the Hildreth-Riewe model, arguing that because
of ignoring the impact of grazing on future range condition and production, stocking rates determined to be
economically optimal over the single period model may not be optimal at all when dynamic forage
production impacts are considered. Surprisingly, however, Torell et al. found that optimal stocking rates
determined by the dynamic model are not greatly different from those of the single period model. Holecheck
(1988) suggests an alternative method for determining the optimum stocking rate that is based on livestock
feed supply and demand. Though largely based on non-economic factors, Holecheck's method can yield
                    
    5 In areas where the annual rainfall is below 700 mm and unreliable, rainfall alone is a reasonable
indicator of herbage production (Hocking and Mattick, 1993). Which implies that in such environments,
range productivity may be more a function of rainfall than of stocking densities--past and present.     9
results that are remarkably close to the average economic optimum stocking rate (Torell et al., 1991).
Modelling The Pastoralist's Stocking Decision
According to Kisamba-Mugerwa (1992), milk is the main product of the pastoral households in
Nyabushozi. However, cattle are also kept for prestige, social and cultural reasons. When faced with
emergency cash problems, pastoralists sell adult live animals for cash. Usually these are adult females
because most of the males are sold off young, to reduce competition for the limited feed resources, which
would otherwise have a negative effect on the milk yield from the lactating cows. The pastoralists surveyed
for this study depend entirely on natural pastures to feed their livestock. Although some have started
growing food for home consumption, milk remains their major food. Therefore, it is only after meeting the
household's consumption requirements that the surplus milk is sold to the market. The proceeds from milk
sales are used to buy solid food (especially for those who don't grow any food crops) and to meet other cash
needs for the family. Thus, the net economic returns from the rangeland in each grazing period t, Pt are
defined as:
Pt =  Pt
m( QMt - CONSt) - Xt(Ct+It) + Xst[Pst - (Cst+Ist)] -  Ct




t  is the selling price per liter of milk less marketing costs in period t.
QMt  is the total quantity of milk produced in period t.
CONSt  is the total amount of milk consumed by the family in period t.
Xt  is the number of tropical livestock units (TLUs)
6 grazed on the range in period t and retained on the
                    
6  TLU is a unit representing a ruminant of 250 kgs liveweight. The profit function (equation 1)
assumes that the selling price of cattle is determined by market forces outside the pastoralist’s control.
However, it is true that individual head of cattle from different pastoralists will sell for different prices
because of size--and probably quality--differences, which are influenced by stocking rate, age, and breed
of cattle. By standardizing cattle input and sales to TLUs, we allow the net revenue received by
pastoralists for each cattle sold to vary accross pastoral households while keeping the per unit (TLU) price
constant. For example, a pastoralist with a low stocking rate and hopefully bigger/better quality cattle
worth about two TLUs each will receive 2Pst for each head of cattle sold; while his colleague with a
higher stocking rate and smaller cattle worth, say 0.75 TLUs each will receive 0.75 Pst  for each head of
cattle sold.     10
farm to build the stock for period t+1.
Xst  is the number TLUs grazed on the range in period t and sold for cash at or by the end of period t.
Ct  are the costs incurred per TLU not sold in period t. (Includes veterinary costs, labor, etc.)
Cst  are the costs incurred per TLU sold in period t.
It  is the interest cost or opportunity cost per TLU not sold in period t.
Ist  is the interest cost per TLU sold in period t.
C
p
t  is the pasture improvement cost in period t.
Pst  is the selling price per TLU less marketing costs in period t.
In the remaining part of this section, we develop a milk production function, starting with a simple
biological relationship between the yield of milk (main product) and range stocking rate. We then introduce
the dynamics of cattle and forage in the stocking decision model, substitute the milk production function for
QMt in equation 1, and define the constrained profit maximization problem faced by a typical household.
Finally, we set up the Lagrange for this problem and solve it for the OSR--which is used to develop a
theoretical measure of overgrazing (OGt). 
Recent studies on stocking rate have standardized the grazing input to grazing pressure (GP), which
is the animal days--TLUs days in this case--of grazing per unit of forage (F). Stocking rate (SR) is the
number of TLUs grazing per hectare over a grazing period of length D days (Hart et al, 1988; Vallentine,
1990).  Using these definitions, GP can be expressed as a function of SR: let X be the number of TLUs
grazing on a rangeland of A hectares for D days, and let FH be the forage produced per hectare on this
rangeland, such that SR = X/A and FH = F/A. From the above definitions:
 GP = D*X/F = D*(X/A)/(F/A) = D*SR/FH = D*X/F  (2)
The quantity of milk produced in each grazing period is obviously related to the number of lactating
cows, the length of the lactation period and the milk yield per lactating cow per day. The relationship
between milk yield per lactating cow per day (Average Daily Milk Yield, ADMY) and the stocking rate
(SR) is defined to be a concave function given by ADMY = f(GP(SR)), with df/dSR < 0 and d
2f/dSR
2 £ 0
over the economically relevant range of production. A linear equation has been the most commonly used     14
some farms overgraze and others don’t. That is, the factors responsible for the differences in the growth
rates and shadow values of forage and cattle across pastoral households, for example, also explain why
some households overgraze their private farms and others don’t.
We hypothesize that the differences in the bio-physical and socio-economic environment within
which the pastoral households operate are responsible for the differences across pastoral households in
terms of milk yield per cow, shadow values and natural growth rates of forage and cattle, etc., and, thus,
OSR. This environment is characterized by: (1) natural factors such as rainfall, soil characteristics, etc.,
(2) household specific characteristics such as level of education of the head of the household, size of farm
or rangeland owned by the household, family size, etc., (3) economic or price factors, namely input and
output prices (adjusted for distance to the markets) and interest rates facing the pastoralists, and (4) other
factors such access to extension services, government intervention, etc.
To illustrate the link between the socio-economic environment faced by the pastoral households
and the likelihood of overgrazing, we use the example of a household that is characterized by complete
dependence on cattle for food and income, limited farm size, and a large family. We hypothesize that the
current consumption needs of this household--manifested in family size--dictate the choice of number
(and possibly breed) of cattle that the household needs to stock in order to subsist. The chosen herd size
then combines with the natural factors such as rainfall, to influence the standing crop of forage and
ADMY, for example, which in turn influence the OSR, and finally, the likelihood of overgrazing (OG)--
via equation 15. Determining the relationship between the likelihood of overgrazing and the socio-
economic environment within which the pastoral households operate (which environment is characterized
by household-specific characteristics and choices) is the core of the empirical analysis in the next section
of this paper. Thus, the theoretical and empirical models  presented in this paper are linked by equation 14
(OSR function), upon which we based the choice of the right-hand-side variables in the overgrazing
explanatory model.     15
Data Collection and Empirical Analysis
The data used  in this study was obtained through a survey of 125 pastoral households with
private grazing land outside the Ankole-Masaka Ranching Scheme (AMRS), in the sub-counties of
Nyakashashara and Kenshunga, in Nyabushozi county, western Uganda. These participants were
randomly and independently drawn from the list of cattle owning (pastoral) households in Nyabushozi
county. This list was prepared by the Mbarara District Veterenary Office, shortly before starting the
county-wide vaccination exercise against foot and mouth disease (FMD) in December, 1995. However,
some of the data needed to determine the OSR (equation 14) for each participating household--such as the
natural growth rates of cattle and forage, the standing crop of forage, etc.--could not be obtained within
the time and financial constraints faced by this study. As a result, an alternative model, ILCA'S
7 BIO-
ECONOMIC HERD MODEL (IBIEHM)--a dynamic bio-economic simulation model developed at ILCA
by von Kaufmann et al. (1990), was used to rank pastoralists according to the severity of overgrazing. The
IBIEHM uses Holecheck’s method to determine the OSR (Holecheck, 1988), which is based on Total
Usable Forage (TUF) available and Total Forage Demand (TFD) of the grazing animals for the entire
grazing period. It also uses a standard measure of livestock input on the range known as the Tropical
Livestock Unit (TLU) to calculate the Carrying Capacity (CC) of the range utilized. The following















R is the number of tropical livestock units that the range can support.
                    
7 ILCA stands for International Livestock Centre for Africa. This name has been changed to
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI).     16
DM
A is the annual dry matter provision from the pastures.
BDFI is the base daily feed intake as a percentage of liveweight.
DGP is the number of days in one grazing period (this figure was set at 365 days because cattle graze
throughout the year).
LW is the liveweight of one tropical livestock unit (250 kgs).
ARF is the annual rainfall.
GA is the grazing area in hectares.
DMPP
RH is the kilograms of dry matter pasture production per mm of rainfall and hectare.
%DMEA is the percentage of dry matter effectively available to the livestock.
TLU
H is the number of tropical livestock units in the herd.
HTLW is the herd total liveweight (summation of the number of cattle in the herd multiplied by their
respective liveweights).
CC
U  is the carrying capacity utilized, usually expressed as a percentage. When CC
U = 100%, the
available pastures provide just enough dry matter for the animals on the range. If CC
U < 100%, the range
is understocked; if CC
U >100%, it is overstocked.
The pastoralists that participated in this study rely entirely on natural pastures to feed their cattle.
There was absolutely no use of supplemental feeds or fodder from cultivated forage. Without any form of
supplementation, it is logical to assume that overstocking would result in overgrazing in the long-run.
Therefore, in the absence of an empirically determined  OSR, the difference between the actual % CC
U
and the 100% CC
U mark--the point at which the available pastures provide just enough dry matter for the
animals on the range--is used to measure the likelihood of overgrazing (OG). In other words,
OG = Actual % CC
U - 100% CC
U  (20)
Data on herd structure, liveweights, offtake rates, calving rate, mortality rate, annual
rainfall and grazing area was entered into the IBIEHM model and values of % CC
U --projected
over a period of 10 years--were obtained for each farm. However, because it is hard to predict the
likely behavior of each pastoral household 10 years into the future based on the one-year data
collected, only the values of % CC
U for the first year--for which data is available--are used for the     17




Variables and Estimation Procedure
A standard linear regression model is used to explain overgrazing on the private farms, that is,
OG (equation 20) is regressed against a set of explanatory variables chosen on the basis of their
theoretical importance to the study. The explanatory variables used are described in table 1 below.     18
Table 1: Description of the explanatory variables
Variable Description
ALT.INC Alternative income: The household income earned from other sources--off-farm or on-farm--
that are not related to cattle. It captures the effect of alternative sources of income on the
likelihood of overgrazing.
HSE Value of house  (scale: 5-10): Derived by summing up the scores for the materials used to
construct the house inhabited by the pastoral household. The value of the house inhabited by a
household is often used as a proxy for household income or wealth in empirical research.
However, among the pastoralists, wealth is measured by number of cattle owned. It is not
uncommon to find a household with several hundred of cattle staying in a temporary grass-
thatched house, and another household with fewer cattle staying in a permanent iron-
roofed/brick-walled house. Whereas using number of cattle as a measure of wealth would rank
the former household as being richer, using value of house would do the opposite. In this case,
the value of the house is an indicator of how settled a household is in the place where the
interview was conducted. This variable captures the effect of a pastoral  household's decision to
settle in one area (to practice settled livestock farming) on the likelihood of overgrazing.
B/Acc. Type of Bank Account held by the head of household: This variable is used as a proxy for the
pastoralists’ use of banking services to store wealth or savings. It takes on a score of  0 if no
bank account; 1 if savings account; and 2 if current account. This variable measures the effect
of a wealth storage alternative on the likelihood of overgrazing; and the scoring (0 to 2)
represents increasing use of banking to store wealth. The current account was given a higher
score than the savings account for two reasons: (1) the primary purpose of opening the account;
and  (2) the length of time the account has been in use. In 1995, all pastoralists who sell their
milk to the Dairy Corporation Milk Collection Centers were told to open savings accounts, so
that the Corporation would fortnightly deposit their proceeds directly into their accounts. Those
who had bank accounts (mainly current accounts) before 1995 were not required to open new
accounts, and we assume that they opened these accounts voluntarily for the purpose of storing
their wealth/savings. On the other hand, those who opened savings accounts in 1995 didn't do
so for the purpose of depositing their savings, but for receiving payment from the Corporation,
and their accounts have been in use for a shorter time than the current accounts. That is why
holders of current accounts were given a higher score, to represent more use of the bank to store
wealth.
CROPLND Cropland:The amount of land allocated to growing food crops; an alternative food source.
FMLY Family Size: The number of people living and eating together in a household. It captures the
effect of current consumption needs of a pastoral household on the likelihood of overgrazing.
ALT.LND Alternative grazing land: This variable takes on a score of 1 if in addition to the private land,
the pastoralist has access to some other land (rented or communal land); and 0 otherwise.
BIP Breed Improvement Practice: Scores 1 if pastoralist practices breed improvement, 0 otherwise.     19
           The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation method is used to estimate the parameters for the
overgrazing explanatory model. Earlier on, we hypothesized that the pastoralist's choices regarding
number and breed of cattle to stock, for example, influence the likelihood that they overgraze their private
land. Thus, the choices made on number and breed of cattle ought to enter the overgrazing explanatory
model. In addition, it was presumed that these choices are influenced by household specific characteristics
such as family size. The possibility of dependence of some explanatory variables (in this case the
“choice” variables, e.g., number and breed of cattle to keep) on other variables (household characteristics)
in the model provides grounds for arguing that the choice variables are endogenous. This would render
the OLS method inappropriate as it would result in inefficient parameter estimates, because of the
correlation between the endogenous variables and the error terms.
However, the problem of endogeneity of explanatory variables does not arise in this study for two
reasons. First, a t-test of the correlation between the choice variables and the residuals of the OLS
regression in which these variables are used as regressors shows no evidence of correlation. Second, the
analysis for this study is based on a one-year data set, and the choice variables considered in this paper
(such as choice of breed of cattle to stock) were decided upon prior to the year when this data was
collected. Therefore, based on the study period, these variables are considered pre-determined and, thus,
exogenous to the model.
Thus, the OLS estimation method is appropriately used to estimate:
OG = f(BIP, ALT.INC, CROPLND, B/Acc., FMLY, ...)  (21)     20
Regression Results
#
OG  =  2.194 - 0.004 ALT.INC - 0.179 HSE - 0.397 B/Acc. - 0.077 CROPLND +














# Numbers in parentheses are t-values
*,**,***Implies statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively.
The regression results show a clear negative relationship between the likelihood of overgrazing
and the existence of alternative income (ALT.INC) and food (CROPLND) sources. That is, pastoral
households that depend entirely on cattle for food and income are more likely to overgraze than those
with alternative food and income sources. This suggests that over-dependence on cattle for food (milk)
and income causes pastoralists to over-invest in cattle (overstock), since fewer cattle--particularly of the
local breed type--mean less aggregate milk output and, thus, less food and income. The results also
indicate that the likelihood of overgrazing significantly increases with family size (FMLY). In other
words, other things being equal, pastoral households with larger families are more likely to over-invest in
cattle (overstock) than those with smaller families. The explanation for this result is built on the previous
one--over-dependence on cattle for food and income; and the reason for doing so will become apparent in
a moment.
During the survey, we asked the participants a series of questions to enable us determine the
percentage of respondents who think they overgraze. This was done to establish whether those who
overgraze know that they actually do, so as to rule out ignorance as a major reason for overgrazing. In
reply, 74.4% of the respondents who were actually found to be overstocking (overgrazing) thought they
overgraze. Those who thought they overgraze were further asked why they overgraze, knowing the
potential costs (losses) involved. They said that they have no alternative land to graze the extra animals,     21
and cannot sell them off, because if they did, the aggregate production of milk (staple food among
pastoral households) from the remaining animals wouldn't be enough to feed the family and have a
surplus for sale. If this is true, then other things being equal, larger families would be more likely to
overgraze than the smaller ones, which is exactly what the results show. Therefore, in the absence of
alternative food and income sources, or when there is over-dependence on cattle, pastoralists overstock as
they pursue the goal of balancing the number of cattle and people in the household so as to guarantee a
consistent supply of milk (food) for the entire family. In other words, current consumption needs--
manifested in the size of the family--make the pastoralists’ planning horizon shorter than society’s. This
shorter planning horizon causes them to “mine” the natural pasture resource at a higher rate than is socially
optimal (overgraze);  and by so doing, they impose a temporal externality to society.
Based on the pastoralists’ claim that the need to maintain a certain level of aggregate milk output
from their herds causes them to overstock, breed improvement sounds like a plausible overgrazing
abatement strategy. This is because it is expected to increase cattle productivity.
8 Thus, for the purpose of
milk production alone, breed improvement would be expected to eliminate the need to over-invest in
cattle (overstock) as means of achieving the desired level of aggregate milk output, and by so doing
reduce stocking densities and, hence, the severity of overstocking (overgrazing). Paradoxically, however,
the results show that the likelihood of overgrazing significantly increases with breed improvement (BIP).
In their 1979 AJAE paper, Doran et al. predicted this counter-intuitive result arguing that the increase in
quality and value of the cattle stock due to breed improvement would result in a reduction in offtake (or
an increase in the reluctance of the pastoralists to sell their high value and more prestigious cattle) and a
consequent exacerbation of the overgrazing situation.
While the results of this study support the claim of exacerbated overgrazing as a result of breed
                    
8  The data used in this study shows a positive and strong statistically significant (p<0.01)
relationship between the percentage of improved breed cattle in the herd and two cattle productivity
measures, namely: average daily milk yield and calving rate.     22
improvement,  there is no evidence that offtake rate decreases with breed improvement.
9 Rather, the
explanation for this result is rooted in the fact that most of the pastoralists involved in breed improvement
also practice breed diversification. They raise two separate herds on the same land--an improved breed
herd alongside a herd of pure local cattle--as a risk management strategy, which often results in high
stocking densities and a higher likelihood of overgrazing. The practice of breed diversification is
predicated on the notion that local cattle are better adapted to environmental stress than cross bred or pure
exotic cattle; but it is also a result of past experience. Pastoralists who rushed into breed improvement
prior to adopting better animal husbandry practices experienced heavy animals losses, to the extent that
some pastoralists are reluctant to start breed improvement, despite knowing that it would enhance the
productivity of their herds. The few who have embarked on breed improvement are maintaining two
separate herds, to ensure that if disaster hits, they are guarded against total loss of cattle.
It is often argued that cattle are used as a store of wealth among pastoral households (Doran et al.,
1979) and that pastoralists overinvest in cattle because of lack of wealth storage alternatives or because
they choose not to use the alternatives where they exist. That is, instead of using banking services, for
example, it has been argued that pastoralists store all their wealth/savings in form of cattle, and as a result
over-invest in cattle and, hence, overgraze. This argument is supported by the results of this study, which
show a significant negative relationship between the use of banking (B/Acc.) as a wealth or savings
storage alternative and the likelihood of overgrazing. Thus, the more the pastoralists used banking as a
wealth or savings storage alternative, the less likely they were to overgraze.
The value of the house (HSE) inhabited by the pastoral household significantly decreased the
likelihood of overgrazing. That is, other things being equal, the more settled the pastoral households, the
less likely they are to overgraze their private land, which suggests that the lack of commitment to settle in
                    
9  The data used in this study shows a positive but very weak and insignificant correlation between
offtake rate and the percentage of improved breed cattle in the herd (r=0.0612); and between offtake rate
and BIP (r=0.0774)     23
one place encourages overgrazing. This finding is explained by the fact that, even after acquiring private
property status, some pastoralists continue to practice semi-transhumance
10 pastoralism, whereby during
the dry season (when pastures and water are scarce) the whole or part of the family moves to set up
another temporary home in some other area with a better supply of water and pastures. Such people don't
care to put up permanent (high value) houses, because they know they will have to desert them for as long
as the water and pastures remain scarce on their private land. For the same reason, such pastoralists hardly
ever control the size of their herds for the sake of balancing the number of animals with available
pastures, because they know that they can move some or all their animals to some other place in case the
pastures at the current homestead get depleted. On the other hand, the pastoralists with permanent houses
would be less willing to move and abandon their good homes; and they try to avoid this by not
overstocking (overgrazing) their private land.
The relationship between access to alternative grazing land (ALT.LND)--over which the
pastoralist doesn’t hold secure, exclusive rights--and the likelihood of overgrazing is positive and
significant, implying that with other things being equal, the pastoralists with access to alternative grazing
land are more likely to overstock than those without. This is so because of the feeling that there is some
place to run to after depleting pastures on their private rangelands.
Policy Implications.
Over-dependence on cattle for food and income has been established as a major cause of
overstocking (overgrazing) among pastoralists with private rangelands. Thus, the most important
implication of this study is the need for the diversification of food and income sources in order to abate
overgrazing on private rangelands. The diversification of food sources requires pure pastoralists to evolve
                    
10  Although this practice has greatly decreased in Nyabushozi, a few pastoralists that we talked to
during the survey said they would do it if necessary, and some had temporarily moved part of their herds
to places outside the study area when the survey was conducted.     24
into agro-pastoralists, so that they can grow some food for their own consumption--in addition to grazing
cattle, instead of relying entirely on cattle for food. The diversification of income sources, on the other
hand, may not be easy without government or private sector involvement in the creation of off-farm jobs.
Investments in food processing plants--particularly those that process cattle outputs, or in industries that
manufacture cattle inputs such as chemicals and animal feeds--would bring jobs to the study area, and
help pastoralists to diversify their income sources. However, an increase in income earning potential
without a corresponding increase in acceptable alternative investment opportunities or wealth stores may,
in fact exacerbate the overgrazing problem because surplus cash will tend to be invested in cattle (de
Wilde, vol.2, p. 423; and Belshaw cited in Doran et al., 1979). This claim is corroborated by the results of
this study which show that the less the pastoralists used banking as a wealth or savings storage
alternative, the more likely they were to overgraze. Thus, by encouraging banks to open branches in the
study area to mobilize savings from the pastoralists; and by educating the pastoralists on the benefits of
wealth storage diversification; or even by adopting measures that make cattle less attractive as a wealth
store (e.g., taxing the cattle held beyond an empirically determined appropriate stocking density for the
study area) over-investment in cattle might reduce, and so would the severity of overgrazing.
The results also indicate that while breed improvement significantly increases cattle productivity,
it doesn’t mitigate overgrazing tendencies. Therefore, as an overgrazing abatement strategy, breed
improvement matters--insofar as it reduces the need to overstock as a means of attaining the desired level
of aggregate milk output, but so does the improved feeding and health care of the animals. Without the
recommended animal husbandry practices, the risk of total loss of improved breed herds will remain high,
and so will the practice of breed diversification as a risk management strategy--which increases the
likelihood of overstocking. Besides, without proper animal husbandry, the improved breeds will not
perform to their full production potential--let alone survive--as the genetic improvement will be negated
by environmental constraints. Thus, those pastoralists who overstock and, hence, overgraze as a means of     25
getting higher milk output from their herds will probably continue to do so--even after genetically
improving their herds. Therefore, any program whose aim is to enhance range productivity and mitigate
overgrazing in Nyabushozi should attach as much weight to animal feeding and health care, as it does to
breed improvement.
Lack of commitment to settle in one place--manifested in the form of temporary-low value
houses--has been identified as one of the factors that significantly increase the propensity of the pastoral
households to overgraze their private land. This implies that government policies that incite pastoralists to
settle in one place could reduce the severity of overgrazing in Nyabushozi. One incentive that would
undoubtedly induce pastoralists to settle is subsidizing the cost of guaranteeing water availability on their
private land throughout the year--even in the case of prolonged droughts. Despite the fact that all the
surveyed pastoral households had private water sources on their land--in the form of water ponds, valley
dams, etc.--many indicated that their private water sources would sometimes run dry in the dry seasons,
forcing them to turn to nearby communal sources, or even distant sources if necessary. Some reach the
extent of moving their families to set up temporary homes in distant areas--e.g. near lakes, during periods
of acute water shortages. In other words, the periodic shortage of water encourages semi-transhumance
pastoralism, which gives the pastoralists little incentive to preserve the quality of their private rangelands,
via stinting. This is because they are aware that even if they controlled the size of their herds to balance
the number of animals with the available pastures on their private land--which they are reluctant to do in
the first place--they may still have to temporalily move if their private water sources run out. The
surveyed pastoralists--particularly the small ones--claimed that the cost of establishing large water
sources that can enable them pull through drought periods is prohibitively high. It is, therefore, imperative
that pastoralists be assisted to expand the available water sources on their land, to encourage them to
settle in one place--since there is evidence from this study that once settled, the likelihood that pastoralists
overgraze their private land significantly decreases. The construction of several communal water sources     26
in the area--that can withstand long dry seasons--could produce comparable results at a lower cost.
The results also show that access to alternative grazing land over which the pastoralist has no
secure, exclusive rights significantly increased the likelihood that pastoralists overgraze their private land.
The current trend of rangeland tenure reform suggests that communal rangeland tenure will be completely
phased out of Nyabushozi soon. By the time this happens, the pastoralists that are driven to overstock
their private land by the existing opportunity of communal grazing land will probably have adjusted their
stocking decisions toward balancing herd size with the available private natural pasture resources. But
before getting to that stage, the recommended policies that provide increased access to alternative food
and income sources, abundant water supply (which encourages pastoralists to settle and stint), and wealth
storage alternatives or alternative investment opportunities would probably provide enough incentives to
the pastoralists to manage (control) their herd sizes--via destocking. This would  trim the sizes of their
herds to such levels that it would no longer be necessary to seek alternative grazing land to feed their
animals. Eliminating the need to seek alternative grazing land would probably eliminate the perverse
incentives inherent in the pastoralists’ access to alternative grazing land, which is not to preserve the
quality of their private rangelands via stinting, since there is an alternative place to graze their cattle, after
ruining their private rangelands.     1
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